The bottom thirty percent of American housing.
An accounting of the asset class no one has bothered to name properly — and why our capital is moving into it deliberately, at scale, in a senior-secured wrapper, for the next decade.
Twenty-eight million American homes belong to a category the institutional capital markets have not deigned to name. They are not “luxury” and they are not “subsidized.” They are simply the housing that thirty percent of the country actually lives in — purchased at prices nobody on Bay Street would model, operated on margins that wouldn’t pencil into an institutional spreadsheet, generating cash flows that, by every measure of stability and predictability, ought to embarrass the rest of residential real estate.
We have spent years walking these properties. The thesis that emerged is not complicated. It is the asset class that produces the most consistent cash flow per dollar deployed of any residential category. It is the asset class with the highest social return per dollar deployed. And it is the asset class with the lowest institutional participation, by a wide margin, of any residential category we have measured.
The structure should match the asset.
The asset is the income. The wrapper, therefore, is debt — senior-secured, first-lien, recorded, with title insurance. Equity is the right wrapper when value creation comes from appreciation. Debt is the right wrapper when value creation comes from income. Naturally Occurring Affordable Housing is income. So we built a bond.
What follows in this Digest is the long version: why mobile-home communities, how we underwrite, how the impact is verified by people who aren’t us, and the letters and field notes we’ve published along the way. Use the index to your left.
